Abstract. In this report, we describe an approach that integrates a mathematical speci cation language with more traditional software design techniques to yield a practicable methodology for the speci cation of safety-critical control systems. To manage complexity and to foster separation of concerns, the system design model is divided into three views: the architectural view, speci ed with object and class diagrams the reactive view, speci ed with statecharts and the functional view, speci ed with Z. A systematic relationship between the reactive and the functional view entails proof obligations to guarantee semantic compatibility. W e illustrate this approach with a case study on controlling a heavy hydraulic press.
Introduction
Formal methods have been seriously applied during the past years in various industrial and academic pilot projects as reported, for instance, in 3]. However, the breakthrough has not yet been achieved. Many companies involved in such projects are scaling down their use of formal methods to a level that is in accordance with their current industrial relevance. For instance, they have only small teams of highly trained research s t a w orking on selected critical aspects of systems.
What are the reasons for the failure of formal methods to achieve broader acceptance? From our own experience and from our analysis of experience reports ( 3, 8 , 1 2 ] , for instance), we b e l i e v e that one major reason is that presently formal methods come with too broad a goal. Often, they aim at a superior and uncompromising methodological framework for the development of perfectly correct systems. They often presuppose idealized circumstances, and they have usually been developed in academic environments where such circumstances can be guaranteed. Also, such a monolithic approach does not leave m uch room for coexistence and interaction with other methodologies that are in standard use within an industrial development context. Still, research o n s u c h methods is necessary and has provided us with many useful techniques and results, but it is highly unlikely to lead to methods that will be quickly accepted in practice.
We believe that a more modest approach t o t h e i n tegration of formal techniques into the system design process will lead to a more immediate application of such t e c hniques 7] . Starting out from existing and accepted conventional design methods which are amenable to the integration of mathematical techniques, one should investigate at which p o i n ts during the design process mathematical techniques can be smoothly and usefully integrated. The rationale for the use of formal techniques at these points should be convincing to the experienced engineer. Once experiments and case studies have p r o vided evidence that the formal elements introduced are accepted, one can start to investigate further possible anchor points for mathematical techniques. This investigation can then be based on the experience gained during the rst phase and on the evolving formal literacy of the design team. Hence, in principle, by iterating this process, one obtains a method that has more and more formal elements. It is important to note, that we do not attempt to embed conventional techniques into a formal method but rather the other way around.
In this report, we s k etch an approach that sets out to integrate a mathematical speci cation technique into a well-known engineering technique in order to yield a practicable methodology for the speci cation of safety-critical control systems. Our starting point is the statechart notation, which i s c u r r e n tly gaining acceptance in industry for the speci cation of embedded systems. To c o p e with the growing complexity and the safety requirements of these systems, we propose an integration of the speci cation language Z into statecharts, Z being used to model the data structures and data transformations within the system.
The idea of combining statecharts and Z is certainly not new for example 1] uses a combination of Z and timed statecharts in the context of an application from avionics. The next section explains key ideas of our approach. The remaining sections illustrate the approach b y developing a control system for a heavy hydraulic press.
Speci cation Methodology
A widely used technique in modern software engineering is to model a system by a combination of di erent { b u t s e m a n tically compatible { \views" of that system. The primary bene t of such an approach i s t o k eep very complex systems manageable and to detect misconceptions or inconsistencies at an early stage. In the approach presented here, we divide the modeling into three views: the architectural model of the system, the reactive model of the system, and the functional model of the system (Figure 1 ).
The architectural model of a system describes the relationships between the types of components used in the system as well as the actual con guration of the system components itself. For the description of this model, we adopt the object-oriented modeling paradigm 2, for instance]: We understand an embedded control system as a hierarchically structured collection of objects that change state and interact with each other throughout their lifetime. The relationships between object classes are described using well-known elements of class diagrams, i.e. diagrams displaying classes and their structural relationships, such as aggregation and inheritance.
The two other views are primarily concerned with the speci cation of the behavior of single components of the embedded control system. We m a k e a fundamental distinction with respect to the behavior of system components. The functional model of a component comprises data de nitions, data invariants, and data transformation relations, in particular, for any component, its encompasses its local state and the input/output relation of its operations. Constraints, e.g. related to safety properties, about the components states can be derived based on these descriptions. The reactive model comprises the life-cycle of components, i.e. interactions with other components and the control of time during these interactions. Reactive b e h a vior is modeled by specifying how, and under which timing constraints, operations from external objects are requested or supplied (or both) in the state changes of objects.
We specify reactive behavior using an appropriate variant of timed hierarchical state transition diagrams, i.e. with a variant of statecharts 5]. There are two reasons for this choice: rstly, statecharts have p r o ven to be su ciently expressive for modeling complex component i n teractions and time control, and secondly, the use of statecharts, or close variants of statecharts, is currently spreading in industry. This also enables us to use existing analysis and simulation tools for this notation.
Often, functional behavior in state-based systems is speci ed by textual or formal descriptions of pre-and postconditions and of data invariants. In our approach, we specify the functional behavior of objects using the state-based formal speci cation language Z 13] . There are two main reasons for using Z:
rstly, in our view, Z has proven to be particularly useful for modeling complex functional data transformations and secondly, both in academia and industry, Z has become one of the most widely used formal speci cation notations. Since we aim at a practical approach when modeling functionality, w e try to stick to a constructive subset of Z, i.e. a subset that can be compiled into e cient code, whenever this is reasonable in a particular application. The use of a mathematical notation for modeling functional behavior enables us to prove abstract safety properties about the control system, such a s p r o visions that the system may never enter certain hazardous states. Safety conditions imposed on data structures and data relationships should, of course, be speci ed using the full expressive p o wer of the Z language.
Note that we a r e not arguing in favor of a monolithically formal approach. Rather, our goal is to systematically embed mathematical elements into industrially used engineering techniques. As will be seen, this leads to an approach some parts of which are \hard", i.e. fully precise, while others remain \softer", i.e. allow for a certain range of interpretations. In our view, such a n a p p r o a c h leaves more room to be adapted to the actual circumstances in particular industrial application contexts.
The Case Study: Control of a Hydraulic Press
We consider a simple embedded control system, a controller for a heavy hydraulic press that is operated manually. Hydraulic presses are devices for pressing workpieces into a certain shape. The human operator, at the press, places the workpiece in the press and initiates the closing of the press. The plunger of the press moves down, presses the workpiece and subsequently moves up again. The workpiece can then be removed from the press and the entire process may be repeated.
Hydraulic presses are dangerous, since the worker operating the press may hurt himself by accidentally trapping his hand in the press. A typical safety device to prevent hand injuries are two-hand controllers, i.e. control units with two buttons, located about 1 meter apart, that must both be kept pressed while a potentially dangerous action is performed 4]. In addition, both buttons must be pressed within a small period of time (in our example 0.5 sec) in order to successfully initiate the closing of the press. The obvious intention behind twohand controllers is to keep both of the worker's hands out of the danger area. If a button is released while the press is closing, the press will immediately stop and reopen. However, after a certain point i s r e a c hed, which w e c a l l t h e critical point, the closing press can no longer be stopped physically, and hence cannot react to the release of a button. Finally, for reasons of reliability, the system should be capable of detecting sensor readings that are incompatible with the physical properties of the press. In such a situation, which might be due to a broken sensor or a failure in message transmission, the system should immediately stop the press. This very simple embedded system is a good example to introduce and explain our approach, since it comes with interesting safety and real-time constraints, but is simple enough to not clutter the presentation with technical details. It should be obvious that the above informal speci cation is far too sketchy to adequately specify the required system behavior.
Architectural View
In the previous section, we h a ve presented the informal requirements of the hydraulic press control case study. Since this is a very small example, the analysis and architectural design is straightforward. The results are summarized in the diagrams presented in Figures 2 and 4 . For this example, we mostly use notations inspired from OMT 10] and Booch 2 ] . However, choice of notations is by n o means essential and it should not be di cult for the experienced to adapt the information content of the following diagrams to his favorite notation. The class diagram describes a two-hand press-object as consisting of four subobjects: two buttons to control the press, the physical press, and a data sampler. Aggregation is denoted by links adorned with a rhomb. Multiplicities can be speci ed explicitly along aggregation links. A button is a particular instance of a sensor. It o ers an operation to read its (only) measured value. This value indicates whether the button is currently pressed. The parameter instantiation relationship is denoted by dashed arrows. In addition to being an instantiation, a button is also a specialization of a sensor, because it incorporates additional operations for pressing and releasing a button. The specialization (or inheritance) relationship is denoted by links adorned with a triangle. In the context of this case study, the physical press is modeled as an entity specializing both a sensor and a motor. In particular, besides an operation to read the current state of the press, it includes operations to move u p , d o wn and to stop. The physical press is also an instantiation of a sensor measuring three values. These values are further described below.
In Figure 2 , the sampler and the control of the subobjects of the two-hand press together constitute the software part of the system. The press and the buttons model physical objects, connected to the control by c o m m unication lines. From a more traditional, software-centered point of view they would be represented as the environment of the software control component.
Since this is a rather simple system and it has a severe real-time requirement, our main architectural decision is to adopt a time-frame approach to specify its behavior (see Figure 3 ). More speci cally, the idea is to let the sampler periodically read the current v alues measured by t h e p h ysical press and the buttons and then, based on these values, to send control messages to the press control itself. The sending of these messages can be interpreted like e v ents a ecting control. The press control processes these messages and converts them into motor commands to move the press. In this sense the purpose of the sampler is to abstract from the low-level details of communication with the external devices and to o er an appropriate interface to the logical view of the controller. Of course, we m ust be concerned that the control does not miss a relevant input, i.e. the maximum time for the control to react to an input must be less than the length of sampling interval. The controller requests the operation of individual buttons using natural number indices, e.g. Button The communication relationships between objects of this system are displayed in Figure 4 .
Process
Of course, there are many alternative approaches to this speci c one, for example the two sensors could themselves be active processes interrupting the control by signaling events to it. However, the advantage of time-frame based processing is that we can more rigorously control the order of events. Furthermore, given the small number of sensors in this case study a concurrent solution would not be very realistic. press is in default position, i.e. at the top. The control then enters the running mode. In case of a malfunction, the motor is stopped and a special error state is entered. A malfunction is recognized if the sensors deliver values that are not expected at any p o i n t o f o p e r a t i o n . UnexpectedSignals is an abbreviation for a group of transitions. We return to its de nition below. Following common conventions, we denote states by rounded boxes and indicate their names on the upper left corner. As usual, we use a dot-anchored kind of arrow t o p o i n t to default substates to be entered when entering a complex state. In general we use two kinds of transitions, operation transitions and timeout transitions.
The arrows for operation transitions are in general adorned as follows:
ProvidedOperations Condition]=RequestedOperations If the object is in the source state and one of the indicated provided operations, separated by or, is requested from an external object, then, if the condition is satis ed, the indicated operations are requested from the indicated external objects and the object changes into the target state of the arrow. The condition is optional, an omitted condition acts as a condition that is always true. Requested operations are optional too: if no requested operations are indicated, the object just performs a change of the internal object state. The other form of transitions, the timeout transition, is explained below. The running state is further re ned in Figure 6 . The press is operated in a continuous cycle of closing and opening. Entering the state Closing 
ned below. The closing state may be left by either releasing one of the buttons, or by r e a c hing the bottom of the press. Both cases lead to a motor command to move up. Opening then continues until the sampler signals the press being again at the top. Following a common convention about state diagrams, we use stubbed arrows to indicate transitions originating from substates of not yet su ciently re ned states.
The behavior of the control in the opening and closing states has not yet been re ned to su cient detail. First, we h a ve to distinguish between those states in which the closing press above or below t h e critical point, i.e. the point b e l o w which the press can no longer be reopened before closing. This is clari ed in the state diagram in Figure 7 . The two arrows leaving the re ned closing state At t h i s p o i n t, we h a ve su ciently exposed the state structure of the twohand press, to de ne precisely the transition group labeled UnexpectedSignals in Figure 5 . The most complex aspect of the press behavior is obviously the transition from the open to the closing state. This is described in detail in the state diagram in Figure 8 According to the logic of the two-hand press, in order to initiate the closing of the press, the two buttons have both to be released and subsequently both to be pressed within a speci c time interval (MaxDelay milliseconds). Therefore, the safety state, which the system enters initially, c a n be left only when both buttons are released. Now when, e.g. the left button is pressed after both buttons were released, the right button must be pressed within a certain time interval, MaxDelay milliseconds, otherwise a timeout occurs and the system re-enters the safety state. If the right button is pressed soon enough, the system requests the motor to move the press down and enters the closing state.
The transition groups labeled InitiateClosing If the system has been in the source state of such an arrow for the time speci ed in the time expression, then it requests operations from other objects and changes into the target state of the arrow. As for operation arrows, the condition and requested operations may be omitted. Timeout transitions are a very simple, but often su cient, means to deal with time constraints. If necessary, they could be generalized to timed transitions 9].
After modeling the reactive view of the global control of the hydraulic press system, we h a ve y et to describe the reactive behavior of the sampler: After initialization, the sampler periodically samples the two button sensors and the press sensor. For each sensor, the current v alues of its signals are read, and, depending on the values of these signals, a certain operation from the controller is requested. We do not detail the corresponding state diagrams at this point. The state diagrams for the motor, the buttons, and the physical press are not part of the controller but part of its environment. Since their discussion does not add anything interesting at this point, their treatment is not further detailed.
A v ariety of formal semantics for statecharts have been developed 14]. The present paper is more in the line of current w o r k o n e m bedding statecharts into an object-oriented setting 11] 6 ]. Therefore, we w ould like t o a d d t wo remarks about basic semantic concepts of the statechart notation as used in this report:
{ The basic communicationmechanism is point-to-point communication rather than broadcasting. Requesting an operation from an object can be interpreted as sending a message to an object, and providing an operation to an object can be interpreted as receiving a message from an object. As speci ed in the architectural view, communications can be synchronous or asynchronous. Following the approach in 11], operation transitions are thus based on the concepts of request and provision of operations rather than the concept of event.
{ The execution of a transition is not timeless and external messages may arrive a t a n y time. As a consequence, the system may not be able to immediately react to a message. Therefore, incoming messages must be queued and then worked o individually. B y c o n vention, if there is no transition for a particular message, then the system does not change state.
Further experience with case studies should guide the evolution of the notations and the semantics assumed here.
Functional View
Following common practice when presenting Z speci cations, we rst specify the state space of the hydraulic press control and then the e ect of its operations on this space. The internal state space is essentially made up of appropriate internal models of the physical components. These models contain all information necessary for the control to decide on which action to take. In order to avoid naming confusion, we i n troduce a systematic naming convention: The internal model of a physical unit U is named UModel. Press controller: State First, we de ne the states of the button control. A button is an object that can be pressed or released.
Button ::= pressed j released Remember, that the requirements of the press control described situations in which both buttons must be released rst before they may be pressed again to initiate closing of the press. To model this information, we use the following set: This schema describes the button model as consisting of the two buttons and a ag that indicates whether a release of both buttons is required. A logical constraint a l l o ws a release to be required only if at least one of the buttons is pressed.
We i n troduce an auxiliary schema for describing those situations in which the press is correctly triggered to start moving, i.e. both buttons have been pressed within the permitted delay after both have been previously released. The internal model of the press is de ned by:
PressModel press : PressState By means of the notions introduced so far, we c a n n o w specify the state of the press control as follows: This schema describes the press control as consisting of the press state and the button control all being subject to two constraining conditions related to functionality and safety: The rst condition states that the press can be open only if it has not been triggered. The second condition states that above the critical point the press can be closing only if it has been triggered. These conditions must be satis ed for any state of the system Note that the functional speci cation of the state space reexpresses information that is present in the state structure of the reactive view. For example, the de nition of PressState is closely related, but not quite identical, to the states used in the reactive view. for example the state Ready can be de ned by t h e following schema 1 Ready TwoHandPress press = ready
In general, our primary intention is to specify each view, so that it makes maximal sense by itself, e.g., in case of the functional view, we are interested in specifying clear and crisp data invariants. As in this example, this may w ell lead to redundancies. If desired, redundancy can be avoided by allowing, within the functional model, the use of states and operations derived from the reactive model. The development of a notation for such derived functional models is subject of current w ork.
Press controller: Operations
We n o w turn to the speci cation of the operations of the press controller. First, we specify the e ect of pressing the left button. Local to the button model, the e ect of this operation can be speci ed as follows. This speci cation captures very succinctly the normal behavior of the operation to press the left button. The e ect of pressing the right button can be speci ed analogously.
Next, we turn to the release operations. Again, we begin by specifying the e ect of releasing the left button local to the button control. Note, that the release of a button may a ect the release ag. Next, we extend this operation to the state of the two-hand press. The interesting case here is to capture the e ect of releasing a button at a time when the press is closing and still above the point o f n o r e t u r n .
ReleaseLeft
PressModel ReleaseLeftLocal press = closingabove ) press 0 = opening press 6 = closingabove ) press 0 = press Analogously, w e can specify the operation to release the right button.
After specifying the button operations, we n o w turn to the operations describing state changes resulting from signals received from the physical press. For example, the e ect of the press indicating arrival at the top of the press can be speci ed as follows: The rst implication speci es the normal behavior, i.e. the signal is arriving during initialization or opening of the press. Note, in this case, the change of the release ag, i.e. after a arriving at the top, a full release of both buttons is required. The second implication speci es the abnormal behavior, i.e. the signal is arriving during closing of the press, in which case the press stops the motor and goes into the error state. The remaining operations CrossPonR, AtBottom, and SignalError. can be speci ed in a similar style.
Press controller: conditions
The condition that both buttons are released can be de ned as follows:
BothReleased TwoHandPress left = released right = released Press controller: internal events Finally, w e specify the sole internal event that arises in case the press is open, either one of the buttons was pressed, but the delay for pressing the other button has been exceeded. In this case, the event c hanges the system back i n to its safety position. This completes the functional view of the control. At this point, the reader may argue that this functional view of the system is redundant, since all behavioral aspects of this nite state system could have been adequately speci ed using statecharts alone. We w ould argue here that the functional view is useful in its own since it shows in a very explicit way t h a t t h e i n ternal models of the physical components satisfy important safety conditions. Admittedly, one could have expressed all details of the \button logic" with statecharts, but this would have de nitely obscured the speci cation and the proof of its properties. Furthermore, this is a very small example, and, in our experience, the data space and the amount of data transformation tends to grow quickly in more complex control systems.
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Consistency
The reactive and functional view of an embedded system can be checked against each other in many i n teresting ways: The basic idea is to systematically and consistently relate the state hierarchy and the transitions introduced in the statecharts with the state spaces and operations as de ned by t h e Z s c hemas.
Relating states
A straightforward way to relate states between the two di erent views is to map every state diagram state S into an appropriate Z schema S z describing this state, and then to formulate various proof obligations for this mapping to be adequate.
Assuming as given such a mapping for a particular component, the consistency conditions can be presented in three steps. For an arbitrary state S from the reactive model of this component, we distinguish between the following two cases:
{ S is an elementary state, i.e. there is no decomposition of S in the reactive model. In this case, one has to verify that the associated Z state S z is nonempty, i.e. Consistency:9 S z .
{ S is a hierarchically composed state, i.e. in the reactive model S is decomposed into exclusive sub-states S 1 , S 2 , , a n d S n (n > 0) with associated Z-schemas S z , S 1z , S 2z , , a n d S nz . In this case, one has to check su ciency, necessity, and disjointness of the decomposition. Su ciency: S 1z _ S 2z _ _ S nz`Sz .
Necessity: S z`S1z _ S 2z _ _ S nz Disjointness: S z: (S iz^Sjz ) f o r a l l i j 2 f 1 ng, where i 6 = j .
Of course, the top-level statechart of a component m ust be related to the Z schema de ning the full state space of the component.
Hydraulic press example
In case of the hydraulic press, the states from the state interaction diagrams can be de ned in terms of the Z-model quite easily. W e illustrate this for the substates of the open press (see Figure 8 ). The second condition states that in the safety position, if any button is pressed, a release is required before the press may begin to close.
The substate RightPressed can be de ned as follows. Su ciency and disjointness can be shown in a similar way. Similar de nitions and consistency proofs can be given for the other states. The reader might o b j e c t at this point, that one may a l w ays de ne composed states in such a w ay a s t o automatically satisfy the completeness proof obligation. While we admit that this is possible, we w ant to stress at this point, that our methodological guideline is to de ne composed states as naturally as possible from di erent p o i n ts of view. In some cases, consistency between views may follow b y construction, in others, e.g. the Open state, consistency must be ensured by a separate nontrivial reasoning.
Relating operations
In the functional view, we h a ve de ned a Z schema for each service, internal event, or guard in the statechart. Based on the association of a Z schema to each statechart box one can verify conformance between the statechart transitions and the Z de nitions.
The idea is to consider an arbitrary state and an arbitrary operation and then to check for consistency with respect to the transitions leaving that state. More precisely, given an arbitrary operation Op It remains to deal with the case that the transitions t 1 , , t n (n > 0) are labeled with Op and guards C 1 , , C n and move f r o m S to states S 1 , , S n . We c heck for consistency of these transitions as follows:
Applicability: S z`p re Op z .
Explicit Correctness: S z^O p z^Ciz`S 0 iz , for 1 i n.
Implicit Correctness: S z^O p z: (C 1z _ _ C nz ) ) S 0 z , i f S z is primitive.
C iz and S iz are the Z schemata associated with C i and S i . Note the applicability check, i.e. any state from which a transition labeled with Op is leaving must imply the precondition of Op. Note also, that implicit correctness has to be checked only for primitive states, as it induces implicit correctness for composed states.
Note that implicit correctness is trivial in those cases in which the disjunction of the guards is complete, for example in the frequent n umber of cases where n = 1 and C 1 Inapplicability is given in the the remaining states. All these properties amount to very simple checks of the given de nitions. Nevertheless, checking these conditions is very helpful for debugging a speci cation.
Conclusions
The proposed combination of statecharts and Z for modeling embedded control systems proved to be both semantically and pragmatically interesting. It is important at this point, to conduct more experiments with the aim of identifying useful recommendations, guidelines, and heuristics for the process of developing such c o m bined speci cations. Parallel to that, tools for translating speci cations into code should be developed or adapted. For statecharts, such tools are available. Concerning Z speci cations, we w ould argue to stick to an operational modeling style, from which e cient code can be generated. This was straightforward in the hydraulic press example. The degree to which s u c h a s t yle can be reasonably adopted seems to depend on the particular application context.
